Cyber Operations in Venezuela: Dark Power, High Stakes

Key takeaways

• Cyber operations in Venezuela now span power cuts in Caracas and repeated attacks on state oil giant PDVSA, making the country a live cyber conflict laboratory.​

• Trump’s remark about “turning off” Caracas lights publicly spotlights capabilities that are usually classified, increasing escalation and attribution risks.​

• NetBlocks data shows connectivity loss during the blackout, suggesting targeted, localized disruption rather than a nationwide internet collapse.​

• PDVSA incidents illustrate how ransomware‑style attacks can choke exports and strategic revenue while leaving core production technically intact.​

• Policymakers now face pressure to define clearer rules for cyber operations that affect civilians and critical infrastructure in contested regimes.​

Blog intro

Cyber operations in venezuela are no longer a theoretical debate; they are playing out in real time across Caracas’ power grid and the country’s oil sector. When Donald Trump suggested the United States used “a certain expertise” to turn off the lights in Caracas during the strike that captured Nicolás Maduro, he dragged usually covert capabilities into the political spotlight. Combined with recent cyberattacks on PDVSA that disrupted exports, Venezuela now sits at the center of a new conversation about how far states will go in cyberspace to achieve regime‑change objectives.​

How Trump’s remark changes the cyber game

Trump’s comment that “the lights of Caracas were largely turned off due to a certain expertise that we have” is unusual because leaders rarely describe operational cyber effects so bluntly while an operation is still politically hot. If the implication is accurate, it would be one of the most publicized uses of U.S. offensive cyber power against another state’s capital city.​

“Publicly boasting about tactical cyber effects can be a double‑edged sword,” argues Dr. Elena Márquez, cyber policy scholar at Georgetown University. “It signals deterrent capability, but it also invites scrutiny of legality, collateral damage, and proportionality in ways planners usually try to avoid.”​

NetBlocks reported a loss of internet connectivity in Caracas coinciding with the power cuts, but emphasized that any cyber component would likely have been tightly scoped and not a blanket shutdown of the country’s networks. That aligns with how mature cyber forces typically design effects: bounded, time‑limited, and tightly coupled to specific operational goals rather than indiscriminate nationwide disruption.​

Technical layers: what “different effects” could mean

Gen. Dan Caine’s description of U.S. Cyber Command and Space Command “layering different effects” to create a pathway for incoming forces hints at a blended playbook. In practice, that could include temporary grid disruptions, localized telecom interference, GPS degradation, or deception operations against command‑and‑control systems.​

“Lead analyst Marco De Santis of the Atlantic Cyber Council notes, “What you see in Venezuela looks like classic multi‑domain integration: cyber to blind or slow the defender, space assets for sensing, and kinetic forces to exploit that window.” This kind of choreography is exactly what U.S. doctrine has been moving toward under concepts like Joint All‑Domain Operations.​

However, the more cyber is intertwined with kinetic strikes, the harder it becomes to argue that certain digital actions are below the threshold of “use of force” under international law. That ambiguity matters because it shapes how rivals like Russia, China, and Iran may justify their own cyber actions against Western infrastructure in future crises.​

Venezuela’s broader cyber vulnerability: PDVSA and critical infrastructure

The blackout around Caracas is only one front in a wider pattern of cyber pressure on Venezuela’s critical infrastructure. In December, PDVSA reported a cyberattack it said did not damage operational facilities, even as Reuters and others described halted shipments and disrupted administrative systems. Ship loading was suspended, staff were told to shut down computers and cut Wi‑Fi and Starlink links, and export flows slowed sharply.​

“According to Lara Cheng, energy cybersecurity lead at StratEnergy Advisors, the PDVSA case shows how attackers can ‘weaponize the back office’—paralyzing exports and cash flow without touching pipelines or refineries.” Venezuela framed the incident as another hostile act linked to U.S. pressure, while Washington declined to publicly confirm any role.​

For Caracas, repeated cyber incidents compound long‑running grid fragility, underinvestment, and politicization of state‑owned enterprises. For outside observers, they highlight how much strategic leverage sits in software, identity systems, and network architecture—not just in physical wells, turbines, or substations.​

Norms, escalation, and what comes next

If cyber operations in venezuela did help turn off the lights and slow PDVSA, they raise hard questions that the international system has not fully answered. When electricity cuts or ransomware‑style disruptions hit civilian populations, the line between legitimate military objective and unlawful collective punishment can blur quickly.​

“According to James Okafor, director at the Global Cyber Stability Initiative, the Venezuela episode will be cited in every future debate about whether cyber operations against power and oil infrastructure are ‘fair game’ or dangerously escalatory.” He warns that today’s precedents will be tomorrow’s justification for retaliation against Western grids, ports, and logistics hubs.​

For security leaders, three priorities stand out:

• Harden critical infrastructure, including in “non‑combatant” states that might get hit as collateral or as pressure points in proxy conflicts.​

• Improve independent monitoring and transparency—NetBlocks‑style telemetry, forensic readiness, and public‑private information sharing help cut through propaganda on all sides.​

• Push for clearer cyber norms that focus on protecting civilian infrastructure even when regimes are under intense geopolitical pressure.​

For readers of your site, this story is not just about Venezuela; it is a preview of how the next generation of crisis and regime‑change operations could be fought, signaled, and contested in the dark.​

For deeper background on cyber risk and infrastructure, you can link to your explainer on critical infrastructure cyber resilience here: Russian GRU Cyberattacks on Energy Infrastructure: Inside the Edge Device Threat (2025 Report)​

References

1. 1. Politico – “Trump suggests US used cyberattacks to turn off lights in Venezuela during strikes”
      https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/03/trump-venezuela-cyber-operation-maduro-00709816​

   2. Reuters / MarineLink – “Venezuela’s PDVSA suffers cyberattack as tankers make u-turns”
      https://www.marinelink.com/blogs/blog/venezuelas-pdvsa-suffers-cyberattack-as-tankers-make-uturns-103830​

   3. Reuters – “Venezuela’s PDVSA suffers cyberattack, tankers make u-turns amid…”
      https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelas-pdvsa-says-operations-unaffected-by-cyber-attack-blames-us-2025-12-15/​

   4. Reuters – “Oil tanker loading resumes in Venezuela, but most exports on hold”
      https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/venezuelas-pdvsa-resuming-oil-cargo-deliveries-after-cyberattack-sources-say-2025-12-17/​

   5. NetBlocks outage reporting for Venezuela
      https://netblocks.org/reports/venezuela-suffers-major-power-outage-knocking-out-internet-connectivity-W80JljBK​

   6. NetBlocks – main site and live metrics
      https://netblocks.org​

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